We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set.
Introduction
Convex cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) introduced by Shapley (1971) arise from a wide range of applications. Airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973) , bankruptcy games (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) , sequencing games (Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs, 1989) and standard tree games (Granot, Maschler, Owen, and Zhu, 1996) are all convex.
Convex TU games are exact (Schmeidler, 1972) . In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation such that the coalition only gets its stand-alone value. Calleja, Borm, and Hendrickx (2005) show that the class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with the class of non-negative exact games. Csóka, Herings, and Kóczy (2008) demonstrate that the class of exact games equals the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty.
Although transferable utility has proved itself to be a very valuable workhorse, it is a restrictive assumption, and generalizations of convexity and exactness to the non-transferable utility case are highly desired. Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) have extended convexity to games with non-transferable utility (NTU) to define ordinal and cardinal convexity, respectively. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) analyze coalition merge convexity, individual merge convexity, and marginal convexity in an NTU setting. The aforementioned five classes of NTU convex games do not coincide in general. The only general result (restated in this paper as Theorem 2.14) is that coalition merge convexity implies individual merge convexity, and individual merge convexity implies marginal convexity.
In this paper we generalize exactness to the NTU setting. In an exact NTU game for each coalition there is a core element on the boundary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does not necessarily benefit from the gains of forming the grand coalition in an allocation which is robust against all coalitional deviations. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge, and marginal convexity implies NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with the notation and the necessary definitions for TU and NTU games. In Section 3 we define NTU exactness and from this perspective analyze the five classes of NTU convex games. In Section 4 we conclude by relating the various classes of NTU games to one another.
Notation, Definitions, Existing Results
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite set of players, 2 N = {C | C ⊆ N } is the power set of N , N = 2 N \ {∅} is the collection of coalitions, the nonempty subsets of N. Let R denote the set of all real numbers. R N is the n-dimensional Euclidean space generated by the set of players. An element of R N is denoted by a vector x = (x i ) i∈N . For a coalition C ∈ N , let
. For a set A ⊆ R N , the symbols cl A, ∂A and int A denote, respectively, the closure, the boundary and the interior of
Transferable Utility Games
A value function v : 2 N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0 gives rise to a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game, for short) (N, v) . Let Γ TU denote the set of TU games with n players. A utility allocation is a vector x ∈ R N , where x i is the payoff of player i ∈ N . For a coalition C ∈ N , let
The core is the set of efficient and coalitionally rational allocations. Shapley (1971) and Schmeidler (1972) introduce exact TU games.
Let Γ TU e denote the class of exact TU games with the player set N . Convex TU games (Shapley, 1971) can be defined and characterized as follows.
Definition 2.2. A TU game (N, v) is convex if it satisfies the following three equivalent conditions:
Let Γ TU c denote the class of convex TU games with the player set N . A permutation of the players in N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N , where σ(i) denotes which player in N is at position i, and σ −1 (i) denotes the position of player i. Let Σ N denote the set of all permutations on N . For a permutation σ ∈ Σ N , P σ i = {j ∈ N | σ −1 (j) < σ −1 (i)} denotes the coalition of players which precede i with respect to the order σ. In a permutation
) is the vector of marginal contributions. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) characterize convex TU games as follows.
Theorem 2.3 implies directly the following theorem.
For a TU game (N, v) and a coalition C ∈ N the subgame (C, v C ) is obtained by restricting v to subsets of C. Following Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999) , we define totally exact TU games.
Let Γ TU te denote the class of totally exact TU games with the player set N . Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999) show the following theorem.
Theorem 2.6. A TU game is totally exact if and only if it is convex, that is Γ TU te = Γ TU c .
Non-transferable Utility Games
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU game, for short) (N, V ) is a family of sets V = V (S) S∈2 N satisfying the following assumptions:
(9) Let Γ NTU denote the set of NTU games with the player set N . The core of an NTU game (N, V ), C(V ) consists of those elements x ∈ V (N ) for which it holds that there exist no S ∈ N and y ∈ V (S) such that x S y S , which by comprehensiveness is equivalent to x / ∈ int V (S) for any S ∈ N . Therefore,
(10) Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) provide the following balancedness condition for NTU games.
Definition 2.7. Consider a convex-valued correspondence Π : R N → ∆ with a closed graph. The NTU game (N, V ) is Π-balanced provided that the following condition is satisfied: If x ∈ R N , π ∈ Π(x), and λ ∈ ∆ N are such that
Π-balancedness is a necessary and sufficient condition for the core in a non-transferable utility game to be non-empty. Let Γ NTU Π−b denote the class of Π-balanced NTU games with the player set N .
For an NTU game (N, V ) and a coalition S ∈ N a subgame (S, V S ) is obtained by restricting V to subsets of S and projecting these sets on R S , and setting V S (S) = cl V p (S) to have a closed payoff set for the grand coalition in the subgame. Let Γ NTU t−Π−b denote the class of totally Π-balanced NTU games with the player set N , the class of games with a non-empty core in each subgame.
NTU convex games have been defined in five ways.
Definition 2.8. (Vilkov, 1977) 
Let Γ NTU oc denote the class of ordinally convex NTU games with the player set N . Ordinally convex NTU games have numerous applications. Peleg (1984) transforms a social choice situation with a convex effectivity function into an NTU game which is ordinally convex. Demange (1987) provides two examples: a model of public goods and a production economy with increasing returns to scale; Masuzawa (2003) adds N -person prisoners' dilemma games and oligopoly models to this class.
For
Definition 2.9. (Sharkey, 1981) 
Let Γ NTU cc denote the class of cardinally convex NTU games with the player set N .
To discuss the three marginalistic interpretations of NTU convexity (coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity) introduced by Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002), we need the following definitions. Note that the definitions are slightly modified as Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) use a different set of assumptions defining an NTU game. Instead of Assumptions (4)-(9) they assume that V (S) ⊆ R S and V (S) is closed for all S ∈ N ; they do not define V (∅); and they assume zero normalization and monotonicity.
An
Equation (2) in Definition 2.2 of convexity for TU games states that for any coalition U , the marginal contribution of U to a coalition is at least equal to U 's contribution to a smaller coalition. The same idea in the NTU setting is formulated as follows. 1 Definition 2.10. An NTU game (N, V ) is coalition merge convex if it is monotone and for all U ∈ N and S,
Let Γ NTU cmc denote the class of coalition merge convex NTU games with the player set N .
Equation (3) in Definition 2.2 of convexity for TU games says that for any player i, the marginal contribution of i to some coalition is at least equal to i's contribution to a smaller coalition. The analogous concept in the NTU setting reads as follows. 2
Let Γ NTU imc denote the class of individual merge convex NTU games with the player set N .
We now define the vector of marginal contributions for an NTU game.
Definition 2.12. Consider an NTU game (N, V ) and a permutation σ ∈ Σ N . The vector of marginal contributions M σ (V ) is defined by
Theorem 2.3 suggests the following convexity notion for NTU games.
Let Γ NTU mc denote the class of marginal convex NTU games with the player set N .
The five notions of NTU convexity are not equivalent in general. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) show that ordinal and cardinal convexity 2 Note that individual superadditivity was required in the original definition of Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) . In our setting it is implied by individual merge convexity using Assumption (4), S = ∅, and comprehensiveness. 3 We use the convention sup(∅) = −∞.
are not related to each other and to the other three types of convexity. They also provide the following theorem on the relation of the last three convexity notions.
Proof. Since we use a different set of assumptions defining an NTU game,we provide a new proof.
This inclusion follows directly from Definitions 2.10 and 2.11.
Assume (N, V ) is individually merge convex and let σ ∈ Σ N be a permutation. We have to show that M σ (V ) ∈ C(V ). Without loss of generality we can take the permutation to be the identity. The proof proceeds by induction on the cardinality of N .
Let 
From the induction hypothesis it follows that k+1 ∈ S, moreover (N, V ) is individually superadditive, therefore the given c exists.
Point c is on the boundary
To illustrate the subtle differences between the various notions of NTU convexity, consider the following example of an ordinally convex NTU game which is neither cardinally, nor marginal, thus by Theorem 2.14 nor individual merge, nor coalition merge convex.
Example 2.15. (Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer, 2002 , Example 4.1.) Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}. Let
. Marginal convexity of (N, V ) is also not satisfied, since the vector of marginal contributions corresponding to σ = (1, 2, 3), M σ (V ) = (0, 2, 0) does not belong to the core: coalition {1, 3} blocks it. Therefore, by Theorem 2.14, (N, V ) is neither individual merge, nor coalition merge convex.
We will continue Example 2.15 in Examples 3.3 and 3.5.
Exact NTU Games
Theorem 2.4 claims that convex TU games are exact. In this section we generalize exactness to the NTU setting and analyze the relationship of NTU exactness and the various notions of NTU convexity. Note that if an NTU game (N, V ) is NTU exact, then each of its subgames has a core element, since by definition for each S ∈ N there exists a core allocation x ∈ C(V ) such that x ∈ ∂V (S), and x cannot be blocked in the subgame (S, V S ) either. Thus exact NTU games are a subset of totally Π-balanced games, Γ NTU e ⊆ Γ NTU t−Π−b . Next, we check whether the NTU game in Example 2.15 is NTU exact. If for all S ∈ N all core elements of the subgame (S, V S ) could be extended to the core of the original game by an appropriate choice for the elements outside S, then NTU exactness would follow immediately, since core elements of (S, V S ) are on the boundary of V (S). Example 2.15 shows that NTU exactness of an ordinally convex NTU game cannot be demonstrated in this way. The core of the subgame related to coalition {1, 2} is {x ∈ R 2 | x 1 = 0, 0 ≤ x 2 ≤ 2}. Note that only some elements in this core can be extended to the core of the original game: {x ∈ R 2 | x 1 = 0, 0 ≤ x 2 ≤ 1}, since if y 1 = 0, 1 < y 2 ≤ 2, y 3 = 2−y 2 , then coalition {1, 3} blocks allocation y in the original game.
To analyze the NTU exactness of ordinally convex NTU games we define the notion of a reduced game for the case where one player leaves the grand coalition. This notion of reduced game originates from Greenberg (1985) , Definition 3.4. Take any NTU game (N, V ), n ≥ 2, and a player i ∈ N . Define:
Then, the reduced game (M, U ) is given by:
The definition of the reduced game is illustrated in the following example. 5
Example 3.5. (Example 2.15 continued.) If player 3 leaves the grand coalition in Example 2.15, then the derived reduced game looks as follows.
Note that the reduced game is not zero normalized and U ({1}) is open. Moreover, all the core elements of the reduced game {x ∈ R 2 | x 1 + x 2 = 2, 1 ≤ x 1 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ x 2 ≤ 1} can be extended to a core element of the original game by setting x 3 = α 3 = 0.
In general, a reduced game is not always an NTU game. However, Greenberg (1985) shows the following lemma about reduced games of ordinally convex NTU games.
Lemma 3.6. (Greenberg, 1985) Consider an ordinally convex NTU game (N, V ). Then the reduced game (M, U ) is an ordinally convex NTU game.
In his proof Greenberg (1985) considers the setting when V (S) ⊆ R N + instead of V (S) ⊆ R N , for all S ∈ N , but due to Assumptions (6) and (8) all the arguments can be carried over to our setting.
We show the following theorem. Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the cardinality of N . Let n = 1. If an NTU game (N, V ) is ordinally convex, then it is NTU exact, since max{x | x ∈ V (N )} is well defined, is on the boundary of V (N ) and belongs to the core.
Assume that the theorem holds for any game with less than n players. We will show that it also holds for n players.
Let (N, V ) be an ordinally convex NTU game with n ≥ 2 players. Consider some coalition S ⊆ N. We show that there exists y ∈ C(V ) such that y ∈ ∂V (S) and thereby prove that (N, V ) is NTU exact.
Let i ∈ S be arbitrarily chosen and let M = N \ {i}. Lemma 3.6 and the induction hypothesis imply that the reduced game (M, U ) is NTU exact.
Then let x ∈ C(U ) be such that x ∈ ∂U (S \{i}) if S = {i}, and let x ∈ C(U ) be arbitrary chosen otherwise. Moreover, let y ∈ R N be defined by y M = x and y {i} = α i . Then, in Step I we show that y ∈ C(V ), in Step II we establish that y ∈ ∂V (S).
Step I, y ∈ C(V ) Since x ∈ C(U ) by definition x ∈ U (M ), that is y ∈ V (N ). First, we show that y cannot be blocked by any coalition T N . Suppose to the contrary that there exist β > α i , z
x and T N such that (z, β) ∈ V (T ). We consider two cases: T = M or T = M .
Case 1: T = M . Then (z, β) ∈ V (M ) and by comprehensiveness for all > 0 we have that (z,
Next, we show that y cannot be blocked by N either. Otherwise there exist β > α i , z
x such that (z, β) ∈ V (N ). It follows using comprehensiveness that (z, α i ) ∈ V (N ), implying that (z, α i ) ∈ U (M ), again contradicting x ∈ C(U ). Thus y ∈ C(V ).
Note that the construction used shows that all core elements of the reduced game can be extended to core elements of the original game.
Step II. y ∈ ∂V (S) Recall that i is a member of S. If S = {i}, then y ∈ ∂V ({i}) by the definition of α i . If S = N , then y ∈ C(V ) by Step I, which implies that y ∈ ∂V (N ).
If
which implies that there are two (not exclusive) cases:
Then, by the definition of W (S \ {i}), there exists a sequence (β k ) k∈N with β k > α i and (x k , β k ) ∈ V (S) for all k ∈ N. Due to comprehensiveness (x k , α i ) ∈ V (S) for all k ∈ N as well, and the sequence (
Next, we provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact.
Example 3.8. (A cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact). Con-sider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let
The game (N, V ) above is cardinally convex, since (N ) using the third set in the definition of V (N ). Notice that to do so we make use of the fact that for x ∈ V • (N ), x 1 and x 2 can be chosen negatively in order to increase the values of x 3 and x 4 .
(ii) For all other S, T ∈ N it is easy to verify that V • (S)+V • (T ) ⊆ V • (S∪T ).
However, (N, V ) is not NTU exact, since there is no core allocation on the boundary of V ({1, 2}). To see that, assume that there is an allocation x ∈ C(V ) such that x ∈ ∂V ({1, 2}). Since x ∈ ∂V ({1, 2}), we have that x 1 + x 2 = 2. To have a core allocation, x 3 ≥ 2 should hold to prevent blocking by coalition {1, 2, 3} and x 4 ≥ 2 should hold to prevent blocking by coalition {1, 2, 4}) . Thus x should be in the third set in the definition of V (N ), requiring that x 1 ≤ −1, which would be blocked by player 1.
By Theorem 2.14, to verify whether the marginalistic interpretations of NTU convexity imply NTU exactness, it is enough to analyze marginal convexity. ∈ {σ(1), {σ(1),σ(2)}, {σ(1),σ(2),σ(3)}, . . . , N }, thus it is a core element on the boundary of V (S) as well. 2
Using Theorems 2.14 and 3.9 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.10. Each of coalition merge convexity, individual merge convexity and marginal convexity implies exactness in the NTU setting, that is
Conclusion
In this paper we have generalized exactness to games with non-transferable utility to get the class of NTU exact games (Γ NTU e ). In a game which is NTU exact for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does not necessarily benefit from the gains of forming the grand coalition in an allocation which is robust against all coalitional deviations. We have noted that NTU exact games are a subset of totally Π-balanced NTU games (Γ NTU t−Π−b ), having a non-empty core in each of their subgames.
We have shown that the classes of ordinally convex (Γ NTU oc ), coalition merge convex (Γ NTU cmc ), individual merge convex (Γ NTU imc ), and marginal convex (Γ NTU mc ) NTU games are a subset of NTU exact games. Moreover, we have given an example of a cardinally convex game (Γ NTU cc ) which is not NTU exact. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) show that the aforementioned five classes of NTU convex games do not coincide for more than three players. The only general result (Theorem 2.14) is that coalition merge convexity implies individual merge convexity (Γ NTU cmc ⊆ Γ NTU imc ), and individual merge convexity implies marginal convexity (Γ NTU imc ⊆ Γ NTU mc ). Theorem 2.6 claims that the class of convex TU games coincides with the class of totally exact TU games. In the NTU setting we do not have such a theorem. Let Γ NTU te denote the class of totally exact NTU games with the player set N , being NTU exact in all of their subgames. Since an ordinally convex game is exact, and all subgames of an ordinally convex game are ordinally convex, we have that Γ NTU oc ⊆ Γ NTU te . For marginal convex games a similar argument leads to Γ NTU mc ⊆ Γ NTU te . However, using our results it is easy to provide counterexamples where NTU total exactness implies none of the NTU convexity notions. For in-stance, the NTU game in Example 2.15 is ordinally convex, and as we argued that game is totally NTU exact. But it is neither cardinal, nor marginal, nor individual merge, nor coalition merge convex. So neither cardinal, nor marginal, nor individual merge, nor coalition merge convexity is implied by total NTU exactness in general. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2000) provide an example (Example 4.6 there) for an NTU game which is marginal convex but not ordinally convex. That example can be used to show that total NTU exactness does not imply ordinal convexity either.
We summarize the relationships between the various classes of NTU games for more than three players in Figure 1 . 
